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Attribution, Socialization, 
and Moral Decision Making 
Richard A. Dienstbier 
University of Nebraska, Lincoln 
The position developed in this chapter resembles that taken by Aristotle more 
than that taken by most modern psychology theorists, for our discipline has 
tended to approach moral behavior and thought as if two quite different topics 
were at issue. Modern psychological approaches to moral behavior have tended 
to focus almost entirely on the emotional mediation of avoidance and upon 
avoidance behavior, whereas moral judgment theorists have tended to isolate 
themselves from both emotion and behavior, concentrating instead on verbal 
expressions of moral judgments. Aristotle suggested a more integrated view - 
that effective moral training should first involve the young child's emotional 
dispositions, so that the child learned to  love and hate correctly; later when 
maturation allowed reasoning to emerge, there would be a "symphony between 
habituated preferences and what reasoning shows to  be good" (Fortenbaugh, 
1975, p. 49). In an attempt to account for that "symphony" between habituated 
preferences and reasoning in the realm of morality, this chapter's theoretical 
development deals with the interplay between emotions and cognitions about 
emotions, using emotion attribution theory concepts. 
The initial issue of this chapter centers upon what constitutes a moral decision, 
and whether moral decisions and situations should be defined on the basis of 
specific significant behavior by the actor (e.g., cheating, stealing, killing) or 
upon a more complex basis. Research is presented that supports the more com- 
plex approach by demonstrating that when moral values are made salient, 
cheating (usually thought to be clearly morally relevant) either increases or 
decreases, depending on certain specific attributes perceived in the temptation 
context. It is concluded that a complex attributional analysis of situations from 
the individual's viewpoint is very important in establishing the relevance of moral 
values to decision making in various contexts. 
The largest portion of the chapter deals with research indicating that causal 
attributions about the sources and meaning of emotional arousal determine the 
impact of that emotional response in moral decisions and behavior for adults 
and children. Finally, the effectiveness of various socialization techniques for 
both normal and psychopathic individuals is analyzed, using emotion attribution 
concepts. 
DEFINING MORAL SITUATIONS 
What is morality? What constitutes a moral decision? What unique attributes 
must a situation appear to  have before moral values and constructs are elicited? 
The issue is sufficiently complex that it is not solved by simply defining (as has 
Turiel, 1977) certain classes of behavior, such as helping others in distress, as 
arbitrarily relevant to  morality, whereas other classes, such as not handling a 
forbidden toy, are not morally relevant. 
For the purpose of this paper, a moral situation is defined as one that evokes 
significant guilt or shame when transgression occurs; normally, this will mean 
that a significant transgression of one's values has occurred or may occur. Moral 
self-control, on the other hand, will be defined as behavior where one resists 
temptation in a moral situation in spite of the perception that detection of 
transgression is not possible. One test of whether any situation is a moral one 
would be to  determine whether the rate or frequency of moral behavior changed 
(appropriately) as moral values were made increasingly salient; the first section 
of this chapter addresses that issue. Asecond test of whether morality is perceived 
as relevant to a situation would be achieved by manipulating emotional arousal 
or attributions about arousal to ascertain whether moral behavior increased or 
decreased; the second and larger half of this chapter presents research using such 
techniques. 
Whether an individual responds to a situation as a moral dilemma depends 
primarily upon the cultural, social, and individual context, for categories of be- 
havior defined as morally relevant by one culture, society, or by one individual 
may not be similarly defined by others. Within the culture of "middle America," 
for example, situations involving theft, or others being hurt, may be perceived 
by most people as clearly calling for moral decisions, whereas less consensus as 
to moral relevance would exist for some other issues (e.g., sexuality or "hard 
work"). But even for a single individualit is likely that the temptation to perform 
a specific behavior in one situation might be considered a moral dilemma, where- 
as in another situation that same behavior would not be regarded as morally 
relevant. Consider the following example: A college student with the need and 
opportunity to cheat attributes the quality of unfairness to the test and the 
testing context. In that example, attributing the quality of "unfairness" might 
reduce the perception of moral relevance for the act of cheating, resulting in 
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increased cheating. It should be apparent that a great variety of situational 
attributes could potentially affect the degree to whch  moral values and con- 
structs are perceived to be relevant to the choices in a given situation. Such 
attributions about the meaning of each situation will undoubtedly affect the 
attributions about the nature and meaning of any emotional arousal experienced; 
attributions of both types will then influence the individual's behavior. 
A series of studies are presented to  illustrate the point that specific attribu- 
tions made about temptation situations (rather than a specific behavior) determine 
whether an individual will respond to a temptation situation as a moral dilemma. 
Specifically, the research demonstrates the importance of attributes about the 
victim of cheating in making moral values relevant or irrelevant to cheating. The 
logic of the research is simple: If making moral values or norms salient for research 
subjects increases their tendency to cheat on an exam, then the act of cheating 
is not being perceived as morally wrong; on the other hand, if cheating decreases 
when morality is made salient - compared to a control group for whom morality 
is not made salient - the dilemma of whether or not to cheat is indeed a moral 
one. Besides being based on common sense, this approach is based on the research 
of Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1976), who demonstrated increased 
helping behavior after altruistic values were made salient. Schwartz used the 
term norm activation to suggest that the norms governing altruistic behavior 
were already well internalized but were potentiated or activated by a technique 
that reminded subjects of those norms. In this paper, I shall continue to use the 
term value to mean norms that have been "internalized." 
In the first study of the five-study series (Dienstbier, Kahle, Willis, & Tunnell, 
1977) done with the able assistance of Gil Tunnell, we initially attempted to 
explore aspects of emotion attribution theory that will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter. However, the study led us down a theoretical path not 
initially intended. Freshmen male college students were recruited for a study on 
verbal skills and were subjected to a series of tests beginning with a vocabulary 
test; that test was followed by a reading comprehension test (the independent 
manipulation) and then with the opportunity to cheat (the dependent measure) 
on the vocabulary test. Three different versions of the reading comprehension 
test concerning the Minoan culture were constructed: The first versions described 
their high moral principles based upon personal values and guilt (the internal 
manipulation). The second version presented similarly high moral principles 
based upon social norms and shame (the external manipulation). The third ver- 
sion dealt with the high level of achievement of the Minoans (the control manip- 
ulation). As confirmed by an elaborate postexperimental questionnaire (such as 
used in all the reported studies), the later cheating situation was perceived by 
the subjects as free from possible detection. It was hypothesized that the moral 
values that were made salient would be effective in reducing cheating on the 
vocabulary test for the two groups of subjects who read about moral principles, 
in contrast to the (higher) cheating frequency of control subjects. [The reading 
comprehension passages were based upon an article by Davies (1969) on the 
achievements of the Minoans.] 
In order to induce motivation to  cheat on the vocabulary portion of the test, 
the subjects were told that typical college freshmen scored at least 18 right on 
the 30-item, multiple-choice test and that their performance on the test would 
be compared with their future college performance, since the "Board of Psy- 
chologists" developing the test thought that vocabularly scores would correspond 
with grades in certain courses. Subjects were seated in a row of booths so that 
the 6 to 10 subjects present for any one session could not see each other; cheating 
occurred as answer changing during a "delay" period after the test was over 
when the answers were available. Since subjects were told that the machine- 
gradable answer paper for the vocabularly items must be marked darkly and be 
free of sloppy erasures, they had an excuse to use pencils during the "delay" 
period. However, they were warned (as in all the cheating research) not to change 
any answers. [The procedure for detecting cheating using pressure-sensitive 
paper is described in detail elsewhere (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971).] The results 
were clearly contrary to the hypothesis; the control-condition subjects cheated 
less (21% of the 48 subjects cheated) than subjects in the other two conditions 
(33% of the 43 internal-condition subjects cheated, and 43% of the 44 external 
subjects cheated). In other words, the activation of moral values by the internal 
and external reading comprehension passages increased rather than prevented 
cheating - a totally unexpected finding. An informal statistical analysis (Fisher 
Exact Test, two-tailed) was undertaken, indicating a significance level of p = 
.06 between the control condition cheating rate and the combined rate for the 
internal and external conditions. It was not until after that effect was replicated 
with diverse procedures and materials that the finding was regarded as credible. 
Since the results in that initial research were contrary to expectations, a second 
study was undertaken with different materials, again in an effort to study 
differences between cheating rates of the internal vs. external subjects, and with 
the control condition included merely for additional information. That study, 
done with the aid of Keith Willis, was carried out with freshmen female subjects 
and vastly revised independent manipulation ("readingcomprehension")materials, 
though the vocabularly testing part and the cheating opportunity remained 
essentially the same as for Study 1. Subjects were told that since they all had 
similar psychology backgrounds (being all in their first basic course), the reading 
comprehension test would deal with psychology topics (giving no one an unfair 
advantage). After reading and being tested on a passage on the sensation of 
touch, the independent manipulation passage was read. Internal- and external- 
condition subjects read about the development of conscience. The external 
passage indicated that the final developmental step was completed when the 
individual experienced shame when detection for transgression was thought 
to be possible. The internal passage concluded that conscience was developed 
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when guilt was experienced even when detection was impossible. Control sub- 
jects read about the development of immediate memory. A replication of the 
results of Study 1 was achieved, with almost identical cheating rates in the 
internal and external conditions (32% of the 56 subjects in both conditions 
cheating) and with that rate considerably higher than that for the control sub- 
jects (14% of the 29 subjects cheating, p = .05, Fisher's exact test, one-tailed). 
With the unexpected results of both Studies 1 and 2, where increased cheating 
followed the activation of moral values, a more thoughtful analysis was under- 
taken of the situation as it was perceived by the subjects. In Studies 1 and 2, 
following procedures developed for other research (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971; 
Dienstbier, 1972), subjects had been told that the vocabularly test was an ex- 
perimental test being developed by a board of psychologists, and they were 
asked to put their social security number of their answer sheet, "just in case the 
board developing this test decides to  compare your vocabularly test performance 
with your later grades in certain courses - so far they have found that most 
successful college students score at least 18, as freshmen, on this 30-item test; 
a chance score is 10." 
I began to suspect that the subjects perceived the research as basically unfair 
and that this unfairness could be offset by their cheating on the vocabulary test 
to achieve a score somewhat higher (and closer to  18) than they had achieved 
fairly. Furthermore, cheating against an anonymous "board of psychologists" 
might have seemed too impersonal a jesture to  be morally relevant. Certainly 
similar logic is often used by individuals dealing with large institutions such as 
their government at tax time, insurance companies, etc. More cheating after 
moral value activation could be due to  the subjects being able to make a clearer 
definition of morality following the reading of the conscience-oriented passages, 
so that their present situation could be more clearly defined as nonmoral. To 
test this notion, a third study was undertaken with materials and procedures 
identical to those used in Study 2, except that Keith Willis, who had acted as the 
experimenter in Study 2, remade our tape-recorded instructions in his voice and 
claimed that this research was for his Ph.D. dissertation. References to  the "board 
of psychologists" were changed to "I" in the instructions pertaining to the 
vocabulary test, and subjects were told: "Don't change any answers. I really 
need accurate data for my thesis, or I'll have to spend another semester trying." 
It was believed that those changes would cause subjects to redefine the situation 
as a moral one, with cheating an immoral behavior, so that moral value activation 
via the initial reading comprehension passages would result in reduced cheating. 
That prediction was realized with 12% of the 69 subjects in the two experimental 
groups cheating, compared with 29% of the 34 control-condition subjects (p = 
.03, Fisher's exact test, two-tailed). The difference in cheating patterns between 
Studies 2 and 3, run in successive semesters but with the same experimenter and 
format except as described above, was statistically significant (p < .005 using 
an interaction test for arc-sine transformed percentages, two-tailed, developed by 
Langer and Abelson, 1972). The results of Study 3 were essentially replicated in 
a study to be reported below. 
To buttress our confidence that the complete reversal in cheating pattern be- 
tween Studies 2 and 3 was really due to the perception that cheating in Study 3 
was perceived to be morally wrong, especially after reading about morality, I 
conducted a fourth study with Lynn Kahle. In Study 4 ,  subjects participated in 
either the Study 2 or the Study 3 version of the procedure, except that when the 
opportunity t o  cheat occurred, we asked subjects to record their level of resent- 
ment toward either the "board of psychologists who developed the vocabulary 
test" in the Study 2 version or toward "Lynn Kahle who developed the vocabu- 
lary test" in the Study 3 version. Subjects were given the opportunity to respond 
on a 5-point scale with possible answers from "none" (scored 1) to "extreme" 
(scored 5). Those subjects in Study 2 (with the board of psychologists) were 
significantly more resentful than subjects in the Study 3 version (means of 
1.98 vs. 1.43, F = 7.08, p < .01). Furthermore, as predicted, whereas subjects 
in the internal and external conditions of Study 2 were considerably more resent- 
ful than subjects in the comparable conditions of Study 3 (means of 2.13 vs. 
1.47, t = 2.77, p < .01, two-tailed), resentfulness of control-condition subjects 
did not differ significantly between the studies (mean of 1.67 vs. 1.35, t = .89, 
NS). The pattern of data therefore supports the contention that although sub- 
jects resented the "board of psychologists" considerably more than the graduate- 
student researcher, their resentment was accentuated by the reading of the 
morally relevant reading comprehension materials. 
The research presented above (along with a similar study presented below to 
explore other emotion-attribution issues) demonstrates that specific attributions 
that people make about potential moral dilemmas determine whether moral 
values (and by inference, avoidance-mediating emotions such as guilt and shame) 
are relevant to  one's behavioral choices. Making morality salient in the research 
above either increased or decreased the number of subjects who saw the situation 
as morally relevant and who resisted the temptation to cheat. 
Unfortunately, this research does not provide an easy key to the analysis 
of what situations will be perceived as moral ones for people in the real world 
or for research subjects in other settings. Instead, I am able to suggest only a 
research technique. When the researcher assumes that individuals will bring to 
bear certain values or constructs in response to the research situation, one 
method for checking that assumption is to preactivate those values or constructs 
to determine whether appropriate behavior is stimulated. 
In the following section, in contrast, the manipulations were not relevant to 
the activation of moral values, so that we may assume that the subjects in the 
various research conditions were equally likely to perceive the moral implica- 
tions of their behavior (often cheating) and were equally motivated to cheat. 
The issue of the following section and of the research described in it is how the 
quantity and quality of emotional arousal and experience affected moral self- 
control. 
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EMOTIONAL AROUSAL AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 
The larger half of this chapter will deal with those emotion attribution processes 
that occur when an individual faces temptation to transgress against moral values. 
The first issue, addressed through the research reviewed immediately below, is 
whether the avoidance of behavior that has potentially painful (physically or 
psychologically) consequences is facilitated by heightened emotional arousal. 
Studies by Lykken (1957) and by Schachter and Latane' (1964) demonstrated 
that psychopathic criminals, who are often described as without fear or guilt, 
failed to avoid errors punished with shock in a lever-maze learning situation. 
(At each "choice point" in the "maze" there was a correct response, an incorrect 
and shocked error, and several possible wrong options not resulting in shock.) 
The demonstration by Schachter and Latand that psychopaths would learn to  
avoid shocked errors when pre-aroused with an adrenalin injection (contrasted 
with a placebo injection) provided significant evidence for the conclusion that 
nonaroused psychopaths disregarded the shock because of a lack of normal 
emotional response to that punishment. Other work by Schachter and Ono 
(Schachter & Latane', 1964) demonstrated that college students would cheat 
more under tranquilizer (chlorpromazine) conditions than under placebo condi- 
tions. Those findings gave considerable support to the traditional view that 
avoidance behavior (including the avoidance of behavior seen as immoral) is 
mediated, or at least facilitated, by emotional arousal. It is only a short con- 
ceptual step to the normally accepted idea that moral transgressions are resisted 
in part through the aid of conditioned fear, anxiety, shame, and guilt, an analysis 
akin to  the two-factor avoidance theory advanced by Mowrer (1950). The two- 
factor avoidance theory states that avoidance is facilitated by conditioned emo- 
tional responses that increase as the individual approaches the forbidden behavior 
and decrease (providing reinforcement) as the individual avoids or retreats from 
that behavior. That theory provides our starting point. 
EMOTION ATTRIBUTION AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 
Schachter and Singer (1962) demonstrated that emotional arousal artificially 
induced by adrenalin injection could be experienced as different emotional 
states (anger or euphoria), depending on the different attributions made in dif- 
ferent experimental contexts. The application of that idea to our avoidance 
formulation, as developed above, would lead to a theoretical elaboration. Identical 
levels of emotional arousal, resulting from a conditioned emotional response to  
(planned) transgression behavior, might lead to very different reactions depending 
upon the attributions made about the causes or meaning of that emotional 
response. Actually, this statement represents little more than the imposition of 
attribution-theory language on an idea occasionally articulated by socialization 
theorists. In the words of punishment researchers Walters and Parke (1967), it 
may be that "social conformity is not facilitated by arousal per se but only by 
emotional responses that are associated with, or are contingent on, certain kinds 
of cognitive structuring [p. 2201 ." The first study in the next series of research 
was an attempt to  ascertain whether the attributions an individual made about 
emotional arousal naturally induced in a temptation situation could be manipulat- 
ed to alter the frequency of tempted behavior substantially. Since other research 
had clearly demonstrated that the quantity of arousal was important in avoiding 
punished errors and temptation, this initial research posed the question ofwhether 
qualitative differences in emotional states under constant arousal conditions 
would yield similar results. This question, if answered affirmatively, would 
prove far from academic, for it could provide one of the keys to  understanding 
how cognition plays a role in modulating the impact of emotional inhibition 
without immediately changing the quantity of emotional arousal. In nonmoral 
contexts, we are used to viewing such emotional-cognitive interactions. Even 
if we are slightly acrophobic, for example, we know that if we can retain our 
belief that a roller coaster ride is safe, and if the emotional arousal is not over- 
whelming, we may experience the arousal state as positive excitement rather 
than negative fear. In our attribution language system, we would say that the 
attribution of the cause of the emotional experience to the speed and fast stimu- 
lation changes rather than to danger allows the emotional arousal to be experienced 
as noninhibitory; we continue to seek out rather than to avoid the roller coaster. 
In the first study of this series, done with the aid of Pamela Osborne Munter 
(Diestbier & Munter, 1971), I attempted to study the impact of different emo- 
tion attributions on cheating. Recruited for a study on the impact of a vitamin 
supplement on vision, subjects ingested a placebo pill and participated in a 
vocabulary testing exercise like that described previously, while waiting for the 
pill (supposedly containing the vitamin supplement) to take effect. The vocabulary 
test was introduced as a delay task, but subjects were told that the board of psy- 
chologists would probably get in contact with them if they scored less than 20. 
Subjects were then exposed to the autokinetic illusion to verify that the pill 
really did have psychoactive effects and were subsequently given an opportunity 
to cheat on their vocabulary test, although they were warned (as in all cheating 
research), "Do not change any answers." At the beginning of the study and 
immediately prior to the opportunity to cheat, half of the subjects were told to 
anticipate possible side effects of autonomic arousal (e.g., heart acceleration, 
face flushing, etc.), and half were told to expect benign side effects irrelevant to 
autonomic arousal. 
In that study 49% of the 47 subjects who had anticipated arousal side effects 
cheated, compared to 27% of the 48 control (nonarousal) subjects (p < .05, 
by Fisher's exact text, one-tailed). But the entire effect was due to the male 
subjects. Follow-up research (Dienstbier, 1972) indicated that the effect held for 
women, too, provided that the threat for failure was made less intense; it was 
concluded that either the women experienced the threat of Study 1 as more 
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attention-preoccupying than did the male subjects, so that they did not attend 
to the more subtle aspects of the study pertaining to the pill side effects, or that 
they were unable to attribute their higher emotional arousal to the pill. The 
hypothesis underlying those studies on cheating was confirmed, with those sub- 
jects who could attribute their emotional arousal to the placebo pill apparently 
experiencing their arousal differently, so that it did not play an inhibitory role 
as they considered cheating. 
Of course there are alternative explanations of this type finding - explana- 
tions that do not assume that the vital process is the attribution of arousal to 
the pill. For example, there is a possibility that merely inducing the subject to  
attend to the arousal side effects might somehow cause the associated emotion 
to become reduced or dissociated from the temptation dilemma. In a second 
study discussed in the 1972 article, that question was experimentally addressed. 
In a four-condition study, half the subjects received no placebo but were told 
that they were in a "control" condition. It was explained to those "control" 
subjects that after the "real" subjects received the vitamin-related drug, we 
assess drug effects through a side effects checklist that those "real" subjects 
fill out. Therefore, it was explained, the possibility exists that suggestions in- 
duced by the questions on the checklist might result in the side effects being 
reported by the "real" subjects when they really are not experienced. To ascertain 
whether this checklist suggestion effect was real, "control" subjects were told 
that they would be run through exactly the same study as the "real" subjects, 
except that they would receive no pill. This is exactly what was done. Half of the 
"control" subjects were given drug information and a checklist concerning the 
arousal side effects, while the second half received the benign side effects descrip- 
tion and checklist. "Control" subjects were asked to "look into themselves 
conscientiously, just as 'real' subjects did," to assess whether they experienced 
the symptoms listed on their side effects lists. The other two conditions of the 
study received the "arousal" and "benign" placebo pills in conditions that 
essentially replicated the Dienstbier and Munter (1971) study. In the "control" 
conditions, merely attending to arousal side effects did not facilitate cheating, 
but the facilitory effect of the arousal placebo in the replication conditions was 
observed. The statistically significant interaction helped to establish that the 
hypothesized emotion-attribution process may be the best logical explanation 
for the increased cheating with the arousal placebo. 
The success of the studies described above led to interest in working with the 
attributional processes that would be employed by children as they faced tempta- 
tion. I speculated that those attribution processes would be shaped by the 
socialization practices of the parents, since different socialization techniques 
would provide different emotion-attribution information. For example, if physical 
punishment followed stealing, would the punishment itself become so salient 
and obvious a source of the child's emotional discomfort that the child would 
attribute emotional discomfort to the punishment rather than to the stealing? 
If so, in future temptation (to steal) situations, would the conditioned emotional 
response be attributed to the punishment rather than to the act of stealing? If, 
in the former case, the emotion was experienced as fear of punishment, would 
the emotion be as effective in preventing stealing than if equally intense emotions 
in anticipation of stealing were attributed to the act of theft itself'? It was 
hypothesized that the externally attributed emotional discomfort (to the punish- 
ment rather than to the act) would be less effective in inhibiting transgression 
when the situation was perceived as detection-free. That formulation is untestable 
for ethical reasons; but the hypothesized ineffectiveness of external emotion 
attributions is testable if external attributions are induced through verbal rather 
than physical techniques. 
Studies of Self-Control with Children 
The research that was subsequently undertaken to  explore those questions was 
therefore restricted by practical and ethical considerations to testing whether 
children would react differently in a detection-free situation after they had 
been given the attributions that previous emotional discomfort (from a failure 
in a similar situation) was due to  being "found out for doing the wrong thing" 
(external) as compared to attributing their emotional arousal simply to "having 
done the wrong thing" (internal). If merely giving different verbal attribution 
information in an experimental context substantially altered subsequent behavior 
in a "detection-free" situation, evidence would be provided to support the con- 
clusion that like the college freshmen in the cheating studies, the emotional 
attributions childrenmake are relevant to moral behavior and extremely susceptible 
to influence; hence such processes could be an important key to understanding 
socialization differences. 
In the placebo research with adults, emotion attributions were manipualted 
in a manner quite dissimilar from real-life experiences. This use of techniques 
not encountered outside of the laboratory was undertaken in order to establish 
that attribution manipulations could induce differential cheating. The shift to 
research with children, however, represented an examination of emotion-attribu- 
tion at quite a different level from that in the placebo-cheating research with 
adults, for the emotion attributions that were induced with children are closer 
to potential real-life manipulations. 
In the first two studies (Dienstbier, Hillman, Lehnhoff, Hillman, & Valkenaar, 
1975) of the series with second-grade children, a three-part procedure was de- 
veloped in which different children were first asked to watch a slot car that 
supposedly had a problem. After their failure at that watching task was dicovered 
by the experimenter, their emotional responses were attributed to being found 
out (external) or to having done the wrong thing (internal). The children were 
subsequently left alone, watching the car for a period of 12 minutes with their 
attention to the task timed after the situation was changed so that they believed 
that they could not again be detected for not watching the slot car. Since this 
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procedure is presented in detail elsewhere (Dienstbier et al., 1975), it will be 
presented here but briefly and only the results from the second of the first two 
studies will be considered. 
In Study 2 of the research with children, second-grade identical and same-sex 
fraternal twins were used as subjects, with one of each twin pair in each of the 
two experimental conditions; Steve Slane and Gail Zimmerman worked diligently 
with me in Study 2. The subject population was chosen since environmental 
and genetic differences (and hence error variance) are nearly equated between 
conditions, permitting a sensitive matched-pairs analysis of the results; differences 
between the means of the two experimental conditions would not be altered by 
this choice of subjects, however. 
In the first phase of Study 2, the randomly chosen participating twin was told 
that the slot car he was to watch was very old and that it might break if it fell 
off the track. It was explained to each twin that recent problems with the slot 
cars included the cars occasionally going too fast so that they jumped the track 
but that when that was about to happen a "trouble light" on the side of the 
"control" (observation) booth would go on. The child was then to push in the 
level indicated on the side of the booth to prevent the "accident." It was explained 
that the man who fixed the toys would soon be called by the experimenter but 
that he could not fix the slot car track unless it was well "warmed up." The 
child was then asked to help by watching the slot car run on the track during the 
experimenter's absence to "call the toy man"; the experimenter then left the 
room. Immediately following the child's transgression to the set criterion (not 
watching for 6 continuous seconds), the slot car was made to jump the track and 
the "trouble light" was turned on; the slot cars were controlled by an observer 
hidden in a one-way observation booth in the toy room. The experimenter, 
having been signaled by the observer, returned immediately after the slot car 
accident and accompanied the child to another room (allowing the observer to 
remain blind). The experimenter then became aware of the first twin's condition 
and delivered the independent manipulation. Except for the attribution message 
itself, the language and emphasis of the two manipulation scripts was identical. 
The excerpt below is a brief portion of the external manipulation script with the 
italicized parts indicating the phrases added to  modify the internal script to ex- 
ternal: 
"I bet you feel a little bad now that I found out the car fell off. I've seen 
other kids feel bad when someone found out they weren't able to do exactly 
what they were supposed to do. When the other kids who tried to watch the car 
couldn't, they felt bad when I found out too," etc. 
At the end of the independent manipulation, delivered in a gentle and warm 
manner, the child and experimenter returned to the toy room. The child was 
told that since he/she knew how to start and control the new "unbreakable" 
slot car, that during the ensuing period with the experimenter locked out (and 
with no key), "even if it (the slot car) did fly off the track, I'd never find out, 
since you could put it back yourself and I can't come right in with the door 
locked." After establishing a "secret knock" so that the child would know when 
the experimenter had returned, the child was left "alone" in the locked (from 
the outside) room for 12 minutes of slot-car watching. At the end of the 12- 
minute period, all children were praised lavishly for their apparently excellent 
performance and exchanged with their opposite-condition co-twin. 
The average time of transgression (not watching the slot car) was 322 seconds 
for the external-condition twins, compared to 177 seconds for the internal con- 
dition children ( t  = 8.0, p < .001). Aside from the mean superiority of the 
watching behavior of the internal twins, a remarkable data pattern emerged; for 
each of the six twin-pairs run, the external twin transgressed approximately twice 
as much as the internal twin, a finding not dependent upon which condition was 
run first. 
An analysis of the procedure from the child's standpoint may be useful in 
putting the powerful data of Study 2 in perspective. First, when the first slot car 
jumped the track, followed almost immediately by the entrance of the experi- 
menter, the suddenness of all that happened seemed to leave most children quite 
surprised; most subjects displayed emotional arousal as evidenced by agitation 
and attempts to remedy the situation and/or to provide excuses for the accident. 
Second, although the experimenter acted warmly and kindly toward the child, 
he was a male (hence less often encountered in this type of situation by second- 
grade children), and he was a relative stranger (hence somewhat unpredictable 
and arousal provoking). In response to some combination of those factors and 
the experimenter's warm delivery of the independent manipulation, most children 
responded quite positively by apparently trying to pay attention. Finally, the 
task was a new one, with which the children had not had extensive previous 
experience, so that they were (presumably) somewhat more suggestible than if 
a more mundane task had been used. Since most factors, as described above, 
differ from typical socialization situations in the home or school, with the dif- 
ferences favoring more potential impact for our manipulation, it should not be 
expected that a similar level of single-trial success would be achieved with similar 
attribution manipulations in natural settings. 
Although most early moral training is undertaken by socialization agents in 
circumstances of the child's heightened arousal following transgression (as in 
Study 2), I was curious if similar results could be achieved in an "innoculation" 
paradigm - a situation of reduced emotional arousal with emotion-attribution 
information given prior to any transgression or error. As the idea developed of 
exploring emotion-attribution procedures under conditions of reduced emotional 
arousal, the question of whether the arousal concept was necessary at all was 
confronted. An analogy to  perceptual-motor functioning seems appropriate. In 
perceptual-motor tasks, when a skill such as driving a car is well learned, we take 
account of and respond to  extremely small variations in directions, guiding the 
vehicle accordingly but usually without an awareness that is consciously articu- 
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lated. It may be that we similarly learn to take account of even slight variations 
in autonomic arousal levels, responding and "correcting course" with (often) 
minimal or no articulated awareness. This belief in the influence of even slight 
arousal was clearly anticipated by William James (1890): "The changes are so 
indenfinitely numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a 
sounding-board which every change of consciousness, however slight, may make 
reverberate. . . . Every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt acutely 
or obscurely, the moment it occurs [p. 4501 ." Although these observations do 
not conclusively establish the necessity of the arousal concept, they do encourage 
the continued use of the concept, especially in light of the earlier cited research. 
That is, it is apparent that most research subjects did not undergo strong arousal 
in the studies of Schachter and Ono (in Schachter & Latani, 1964) and those 
previously cited cheating studies with adults by my associates and me; yet the 
subjects responded to a tranquilizer in Schachter's research and emotion-attribu- 
tion information about the (placebo) pill in our research as if their emotional 
arousal were quite significant. 
The third study in this series with children, undertaken with the aid of Gil 
Tunnel1 and Cynthia Gallentine, was conducted to ascertain whether the emotion- 
attribution procedure would yield similar results under conditions of reduced 
emotional arousal and when given prior to any temptation or failure. 
Data were gathered from 10 pairs of same-sex fraternal and identical twins, 
2 pairs of which were in first grade, with the remaining 8 in second grade. As in 
Study 2, the randomly chosen participating twin was instructed in the necessity 
of running the slot car to  warm it up and on the procedures for preventing a 
slot-car accident. 
But we eliminated any personal failure experience and attempted to minimize 
the emotional arousal of our subjects by telling them about a child who helped 
the toy room experimenter "yesterday" who did not do a good job watching; 
the slot car therefore jumped the track. Together the experimenter and child 
discovered the slot car to be broken - a result that supposedly could only happen 
to such a "very old" slot car. 
The experimenter and the child then left the toy room (to aid in keeping the 
observer blind) to find a "new" slot car that the child would watch. During that 
absence the experimenter became aware of the (first) twin's condition and 
administered the independent manipulation, which was similar to that used in 
Study 2. The external passage below, representing the first two sentences of the 
independent manipulation, has the phrases italicized that represent those added 
to change the internal script to the external version: 
"When the car fell off before, yesterday, when that other kid was supposed 
to be watching it,  he felt very bad when I found out. I know he did, because he 
told me how bad he felt that I found out the car fell off." 
Upon returning to the toy room, the child was told that although this new 
slot car could not break if it flew off the track, it would be bad for it t o  jump 
the track many times; constant attention to the car and trouble light would 
therefore be required to prevent accidents. The locked toy room door and 
secret knock portions were similar to Study 2. To make sure that subjects under- 
stood that their conduct was free from detection, they were told: "Remember, 
this is a new car and so it won't break even if it does fly off, and you know how 
to put it on and how to start it up. And the door will be locked so I can't come 
right in. So even if it did fly off the track, I'd never know." The experimenter 
then left the room, remaining out for 12 minutes, during which the child's 
attention to the constantly running slot car was monitored by the hidden 
observer. 
Mean seconds transgressing (not watching) for the internal-condition twins 
were 188, compared with 346 seconds for the external-condition co-twins 
(t = 2.54, sig < .02, one-tailed). 
Although Study 3 demonstrated that an inoculation procedure under apparently 
lower arousal levels could be similar in power to  the Study 2, procedure utilizing 
prior failure, an even more convincing demonstration would be effected if children 
could be induced to make internal (vs. external) attributions through the use of 
materials not directly relevant to the dependent measure task. That is, one 
problem for the unambiguous interpretation of these studies with children is 
that it is possible that the internal manipulations drew more attention to the 
dependent measure task, or somehow made that task seem more important, etc. 
Subsequent research with children was designed to answer the question of 
whether stories with internal or external emotion-attribution themes would 
differentially effect behavior in a difficult ("detection-free") watching task that 
would be presented to the children as unrelated other research. Although the 
initial research, conducted with the aid of Arleen Lewis, Charles Kaplan, Max 
Lewis, and Keith Willis, was successful in demonstrating superior watching 
performance from second-grade children after listening to internally oriented 
stories (heroes feeling good or bad due to their own performance, contrasted to  
external stories with feelings dependent upon others knowing), subsequent studies 
in our lab failed to replicate that effect; and I feel no confidence in our initial 
positive findings. 
The positive outcome of such studies would have relevance beyond that of 
allowing greater certainty in the interpretation of the research with children. If 
it could be demonstrated that general internal emotion-attribution information 
given in a nonarousing context can be applied by individuals in specific moral 
situations, then the potential for developing moral training curriculae based 
upon this potentially powerful technique would be established. 
Fortunately, research with college-age adult subjects has been successful in 
demonstrating this effect. The first series of research reported in this chapter 
(Dienstbier et al., 1977) utilized "reading comprehension test" materials to 
induce subjects to accept either internally or externally oriented emotion- 
attribution beliefs about the functioning of conscience. But differences between 
those two manipulations were not found in the three studies reported; the only 
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differences that consistently emerged were between the passages relating to 
morality (both internal and external) and the control condition material (dealing, 
in Studies 2 and 3, with memory). Fortunately for understanding the problems 
of Studies 2 and 3,  a manipulation check question was included in the test 
questions; the question asked experimental condition subjects to  indicate what 
the "final step" was in the development of morality. One of the two possible 
answers was externally oriented toward parental punishment, whereas the other 
was internally oriented toward one's own moral principles. The question was 
answered correctly by only 62% of the subjects in Study 3. Since chance alone 
would yield a base rate of 50% correct, it was apparent that differences between 
the internal and external conditions were only weakly established, with approxi- 
mately 24% of the subjects knowing the right answer (and half of the remaining 
76% of the subjects guessing the correct option, yielding the 62% correct figure). 
To strengthen the internal vs. external manipualtion in Study 5 ,  those passages 
were completely rewritten. In all other critical ways, Study 5 was identical to 
Study 3, being supposedly the thesis research of the graduate student assistant; 
this study was conducted with the able assistance of Lynn Kahle. It was predicted 
that with the distinction between the internal and external emotion-attribution 
passages much better defined, the external condition and control condition 
cheating rates would be closer, with the internal condition cheating rate being 
significantly less than the other two. 
Freshmen women subjects were recruited exactly as in Studies 2 and 3 to 
participate in a study "involving verbal testing." Those subjects who read the 
one-page, internally oriented passage on "The Development of Moral Self- 
Control" read that 
Even if the child has never been scolded or punished by parents, the child 
may begin to experience emotional tension when considering the violation 
of moral rules about things such as lying, cheating, or stealing. . . the in- 
dividual will resist temptation to  avoid the emotional tension even though 
no one else may ever know of the transgression . . . as we mature, the 
pleasure which we anticipate from knowing that we have acted morally 
correct remains a strong motivating force in helping us to be strong in the 
face of temptation. . . . Research has demonstrated that often very strong 
feelings of emotional tension result from individuals violating their own 
moral values, even though other people important to them do not know of 
those violations. 
Comparable passages from the externally oriented passage were as follows: 
After being scolded or punished a number of times by parents or others, 
the child begins to experience emotional tension when considering the 
possibility of being found violating the moral rules about things such as 
lying, cheating, or stealing. . . the individual will resist temptation to avoid 
the emotional tension which is tied to the risk of being found out . . . as we 
mature, the pleasure which we anticipate from others knowing that we 
have acted morally correct remains a strong motivating force in helping us 
to be strong in the face of temptation . . . research has demonstrated that 
often very strong feelings of emotional tension result when other people 
who are important to  us discover and confront us over violations of moral 
values. 
In addition to the differences in the internally and externally oriented passages 
as sampled above, at the end of each of the passages a "study question" was 
added to further involve the subject in thinking about morality in the manner 
described in each passage. Subjects were told that if they thought carefully about 
the passage and the question it would help them in the later reading-comprehen- 
sion questions. Internal condition subjects were asked, "Can you think of any 
time recently when you were confronted with a moral choice but resisted trans- 
gression and remained strong due to feelings of emotional tension associated 
with your knowledge that the transgression violated your own moral values?" 
External subjects read a similar question ending with ". . . due to feelings of 
emotional tension associated with you knowing that other people might find out 
that you had transgressed?" 
As in the previous studies of this type, after answering the first set of reading- 
comprehension questions, the subjects were given the right answers to the 
vocabulary test during the "delay" period and an excuse to use their pencils. 
As in Study 3, they were told that in order to avoid having to work an extra 
semester on his doctoral dissertation research, the researcher needed accurate 
data, etc. 
The manipulation check indicated that a much better distinction between 
the independent manipulation passages concerning morality was achieved, with 
83% of the subjects choosing correctly the internally or externally oriented 
option to  the manipulation check question following the delay period, indicating 
that 66% knew the correct answer. As always, suspicious subjects were eliminated 
via a detailed, funnel-type (Page, 1971), postexperimental questionnaire. 
As predicted, whereas only 15% of the 66 internal-condition subjects cheated, 
30% of the 66 external subjects and 31% of the 61 control-condition subjects 
cheated. By chi-square tests, the frequency of cheating in the internal condition 
is significantly different from that of the external condition (chi-square = 4.3 1, 
p < .05) and significantly different from the control condition (chi-square 
= 4 . 6 0 , ~  < .05).' 
'1t is of some interest to note, because social psychology is currently involved in discus- 
sions of the impact of social psychological knowledge on social change, that the independent 
manipulation in this study consisted of passages discussing two psychological theories, each 
having some claim to validity. That is, the external passage was essentially a presentation of 
the two-factor theory of avoidance (avoiding temptation to avoid previously conditioned 
emotion responses), whereas the internal manipulation was essentially the theory of self- 
control presented in this paper and previously by Dienstbier et al. (1975). Differential 
cheating rates were achieved, then, by reading two different current psychological theories. 
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RESEARCH SUMMARY AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES 
It is useful now to consider the implications of all the emotion-attribution research 
reviewed so far for the purposes of summary and in order to explore that research 
for general conclusions not obvious when viewed piecemeal. The initial research 
with college students was presented to establish the importance of emotion- 
attributions in making moral decisions, using a placebo pill manipulation that 
had very little apparent mundane or real-world realism. On the other hand, the 
research with conceptually similar phenomena with children presented manipula- 
tions that had far more mundane realism, such that it would not be difficult 
to speculate productivity about direct applications of that research to  real-life 
socialization problems. But in changing significantly both the age of subjects 
and the form of the manipulation between the initial adult and the subsequent 
child research, we had only the theoretical bridge of emotion-attribution theory 
to join those two quite different research series. The final study presented above, 
using the reading comprehension approach to independent variable manipulation, 
substantially reinforces that conceptual bridge, for the manipulation content 
(e.g., "the individual will resist temptation to avoid the emotional tension even 
though no one else may ever know of the transgression") was purposefully 
designed to resemble that of the research with children (e.g., "He told me he 
would have felt bad even if I didn't find out"). The major value of that study, 
however, is the finding that adults were able to  apply that general emotion- 
attribution information about morality to a specific cheating situation. Although 
that finding would be more useful if it could have been demonstrated with 
young children as well, it is likely that our failure to demonstrate such a general- 
to-specific transition with children was due to working with children who were 
too young (second grade). 
Another theme emerges from the research program as a whole other than the 
apparent convergence of support for the emotion-attribution analysis. It does 
appear that children and young adults alike are remarkably susceptible to 
external influences in the attributions they make about the causes and meanings 
of their emotional arousal. 
How Attributional Processes Affect Behavior 
There are apparently three ways in which the attribution of emotion to an irrele- 
vant source may affect the impact of that emotional arousal on subsequent be- 
havior. Any or all of these effects may influence the role of emotional arousal 
in resistance to temptation. 
The major emphasis derived largely from the research presented above has 
been that emotional arousal attributed to an irrelevant source simply becomes 
less effective in influencing behavior than if the source of the emotional arousal 
is experienced as relevant. For example, one may make attributions, which are 
essentially cognitive, that an emotional response is due to acrophobia on a high 
bridge or due to fear of detection in obviously safe situations. Although the 
quality of the emotional experience may change little or not at all under such 
circumstances, if the emotional arousal is of low or moderate intensity, it may 
be relatively easy and logically consistent to override the avoidance tendency 
motivated by the emotional state. This response somewhat resembles the classical 
psychoanalytic defense of "denial," but it should be increasingly more difficult 
to accomplish with increasing levels of negative emotion. The ineffectiveness of 
the arousal (placebo) pill manipulation with women in the initial emotion- 
attribution study discussed previously was probably due in part to this phenom- 
enon of increased difficulty in acting against the emotion when the emotion is 
intense. Similarly, Nisbett and Schachter (1966) found that under high-fear 
conditions, subjects would not attribute shock-induced arousal to a placebo 
pill with "arousal" properties, though such an effective attribution to the placebo 
(allowing more shock tolerance) under low-fear conditions did occur. 
The second way in which the attribution of emotion to "irrelevant" sources 
may attenuate the impact of that emotion is through the quality of the emotion 
changing as a result of that reattribution. This result is probably more likely 
when a mixture of situational cues is present, some of which make positive and 
some negative emotions relevant. As suggested in the example used early in this 
chapter, the roller coaster may prove very exciting, even to the mildly acrophobic 
rider, if positive cues (other people laughing, the fast motion, etc.) are present 
and if the negative emotional state is perceived to  be due to irrelevant sources 
(e.g., the rider perceives the danger as nonexistent, so the fear is due to personal 
and irrelevant deficiencies). Which of the cues are responded to will depend in 
part upon the chronic dispositions and needs of the individual. For example, the 
intense need for excitement believed to be common to the psychopath (Hare, 
1970) may dispose such an individual to  regard cues associated with negative 
emotional states (objective danger, etc.) as irrelevant (Yochelson & Samenow, 
1976). If negative cues are suddenly perceived as relevant, however, the positive 
emotional state may quickly revert to a negative experience. This re-experiencing 
of a different emotional state due to focusing upon selective cues has been termed 
"drive displacement" by Epstein (1967), who noted that novice skydivers often 
experience outbursts of anger prior to jumping, while steadfastly denying the 
experience of fear. Perhaps Frued observed these processes in developing the 
"reaction-formation" concept. 
Finally, there is evidence that if the source of emotional arousal is seen as 
irrelevant, the emotional response will extinguish more quickly than if the emo- 
tion is seen as situationally appropriate. Loftis and Ross (1974) demonstrated 
that an emotional response would extinguish more quickly with continued 
presentation of the conditioned stimulus if subjects believed that the response 
was not due to  the presented stimulus. This phenomenon is also quite likely to be 
observed mainly at low emotional arousal levels, for case histories are numberous 
of phobic individuals failing to experience extinction of their emotional reac- 
tions to stimuli that they knew (cognitively) to be "irrelevant." 
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SOCIALIZATION 
The various attributional messages that are potentially imparted by different 
socialization techniques can lead to different behavioral results following tempta- 
tion through any or all of the three processes described above. Additionally, 
other variables are relevant in socialization, complicating prediction even further. 
Thus while each socialization technique may lead to different attributions about 
emotional arousal, each may be applied at varying levels of intensity, creating 
differing arousal levels. Additionally, each child has a different ability to generate 
and sustain emotional arousal, and children will certainly differ in their readiness 
and ability to make attributional inferences from the same situation. The charac- 
teristics of the socialization agent, the background variables ofimmediate environ- 
ment(physica1 andsocial),and the relationships that exist between the socialization 
agents and child will also influence both the level of emotional arousal generated 
by any socialization interaction and the child's attributions about the cause and 
meaning of that emotional response. All these variables could interact in deter- 
mining the effectiveness of any approach to the socialization of moral self-control 
for each individual. Such complexity must lead to extreme caution in assuming 
the validity of statements about the overall superiority of specific socialization 
techniques; it is not surprising that research on the success of most techniques 
has been quite inconsistent (Hoffman, 1970). Although the potential interactions 
of relationship, individual differences, and socialization techniques are far too 
numerous and complex for a comprehensive analysis in this chapter, I will discuss 
some of the more significant factors and relationships. Many of these analyses 
are admittedly highly speculative, and it will be obvious that much research 
remains to be done before even moderate certainty is likely. 
The ability to generate and sustain emotional arousal may be one of the most 
important individual difference variables relating to socialization success. Such 
differences, often labeled "temperment," have been identified by many re- 
searchers (e.g., Cattell, 1965; Buss, 1975; Martin, 1971) as due more to heredity 
than to environmental variations (within American society). Most of the litera- 
ture on socialization relates to that majority of children who come from the 
broad middle of the continuum of ability to generate and sustain emotional 
arousal and to those children who come from the high end, appearing anxious 
and overstimulated. This is simply because for such children, normal socialization 
works; whereas with psychopathic children - who evidence a lack of inhibiting 
emotional reactions - little socialization or therapeutic success is generally 
reported. Even within this normal group, the ability to generate and sustain 
arousal related directly to the level of socialization, as indicated by the recent 
work of Waid (1976). That work demonstrated that for a subject population 
recruited through the Rutgers newspaper, greater skin conductance in response 
to a loud tone corresponded to higher levels of socialization as indicated on the 
CPI Socialization Scale. This phenomenon has been previously noted between 
normal and psychopathic populations, with less skin conductance by the psycho- 
pathic group in response to noxious stimulation (Hare, 1970). There are two 
reasons for this more effective socialization of emokionally reactive children; 
obviously, such children would experience more inhibiting arousal when facing 
temptation, but it is also likely that less severe parental responses were needed 
(and therefore utilized) in socialization, with the result that the child would be 
more likely to attribute emotional arousal to the act of transgression, rather than 
to the parental confrontation. 
Induction. As defined by Hoffman (1970), induction involves the explana- 
tion to the child of why certain behaviors are right or wrong; it is, according to 
Hoffman's review of socialization, a most effective technique for inducing moral 
self-control. An emotion-attribution analysis would support and explain that 
conclusion as follows: Following transgression and confrontation, even when 
interaction between parent and child will proceed on a verbal level, some arousal 
is quite likely, especially for the child who is higher in emotional reactivity. This 
arousal will be due to the child's recognition that the parent (or other socializa- 
tion agent) is unhappy with the child, that the child has transgressed against a 
standard that may already be partially socialized (perhaps merely at the cognitive 
level), and that some inconvenience or pain to the child may be forthcoming. 
But by asking the child to focus upon the harm done by the act of transgression, 
the child is induced to attribute that emotional discomfort - whatever the real 
cause - to the transgression. When confronting later temptation, the emotional 
discomfort resulting from the contemplation of transgression should be ex- 
perienced as relevant and should play a role in aiding the resistance to that 
temptation. Hoffman has convincingly presented the case that induction is the 
most effective technique for the development of self-control; I would suggest 
that this would be true for children in the middle to upper range of emotional 
responsiveness; the likely ineffectiveness of induction for emotionally unrespon- 
sive children will be elaborated below. 
Punishment. The literature on morality and socialization indicates that 
when moral self-control is defined similarly to the manner used previously in 
this paper (resistance to temptation under circumstances of perceiving that 
detection for transgression is impossible), that punishment is ineffective - appear- 
ing to be negatively related to morality (Maurer, 1974). On the other hand, 
some research has suggested that love withdrawal or "psychological" punishment 
is positively related to self-control (e.g., Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). 
Punishment is obviously quite effective as a behavior control technique, 
either when punishing agents will normally be present during temptation periods 
(e.g., controlling social problems such as hitting adults) or if the organism is 
not sufficiently developed cognitively to be able to know that there are de- 
tection-free contexts or t o  recognize them with confidence when they occur. 
However, its major limitation in inducing moral self-control, as defined above, 
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is that more than any other technique the act of punishment draws to itself the 
attribution of negative emotional arousal. The child with the stinging hand may 
find it almost impossible to attribute the resultant emotional state to the act of 
transgression rather than to the punishment. Yet, it is possible that judicious use 
of punishment could be useful in eliciting emotional arousal that might (in later 
similar transgression circumstances) be attributed to the transgression itself 
rather than to the early (in socialization) punishment, especially in less emotionally 
reactive children. However, remembering the relationship of misattribution and 
emotional arousal level, positive results with punishment should hold most for 
mild punishment of young children when it is delivered in conjunction with 
internal emotion attributions (e.g., "you feel bad because you transgressed," 
etc.). With older children who are normal in emotional reactivity, a paradoxical 
effect is predicted, with the more severely punished child manifesting less resis- 
tance to temptation, since such a child could make accurate emotion attributions 
about the external cause of the emotional arousal. There is some evidence of 
exactly that effect. In their chapter on the influence of punishment, Walters 
and Parke (1967) reference their own research in which the impact of punish- 
ment intensity and timing interacted for 6- to 8-year-old boys. High-intensity 
punishment was more effective in eliminating or delaying reaching for a "for- 
bidden toy" in a 15-minute "alone" condition if administered early in the reaching 
sequence; however, it was the low-intensity punishment that was most effective 
if punishment was delivered late in the sequence (where it occurs in most natural 
socialization). They suggested that the late, mild punishment might have served 
as a more effective cue, allowing the association of the disapproved activity with 
disapproval more than would be the case for the high-intensity punishment. My 
interpretation would suggest that when elicited early in a behavioral sequence, 
the emotional arousal resulting from punishment may be mistakenly attributed 
to the act of transgression, since this attribution is facilitated by the temporal 
contiguity (but even this effect should hold only for relatively young children). 
On the other hand, once a transgression has been completed, if negative emo- 
tional arousal is then induced by a very salient (severe) external cause, the child 
should be able to  clearly differentiate the punishment-induced emotional state 
from the previous state associated with the transgression itself, facilitating the 
attribution of the negative emotional state to the punishment. Thus a late, severe 
punishment should be particularly ineffective for normal children. Emotion- 
attribution theory can therefore provide an articulate framework for explaining 
why punishment is negatively associated with the development of self-control 
when used in the home and classroom. 
When punishment is inconsistent, it should be even less effective, since the 
child will be more able to correctly perceive the external cause of the negative 
emotional state if it does not always follow identical transgressions. Similarly, 
if an individual is punished very frequently, perhaps due to low emotional 
reactivity (hence slow avoidance learning), strict parents, or due to living in 
a particularly tempting environment, that individual too should learn more 
accurately the real causes of emotional arousal and hence should be less likely 
to  attribute negative emotional arousal t o  the act of transgression. One can fore- 
see the possibility of a vicious circle, with the lower emotional reactivity leading 
to less emotional conditioning, resulting in more punishment, which would in 
turn lead to more accurate attributions about the source of emotional arousal 
following transgression; the ultimate result would be that moral development 
would be substantially inhibited. 
When punishment is ''psycho1ogica1" or love-oriented, on the other hand, 
some authors have suggested that it is effective in the hands of warm parents 
(i.e., Sears et al., 1957). If there is no  specific salient and identifiable parental 
act of punishment in such cases, it may be easier for the child to misattribute 
emotional arousal to the act of transgression rather than to  the punishment 
itself. In short, if both physical and "psychological" punishment induce similar 
arousal levels, the more tangible physical punishment should prove less effective 
for the development of self-control. When the child perceives the parents to be 
warm, it would be more difficult t o  attribute to them and to their act of punish- 
ment the negative emotional response from the punishment, making attribution 
to the transgression itself easier. We might also surmise that warm parents 
probably tend to use milder punishments and more explanations, facilitating 
internal attributions. 
Psychopathy and Emotional Arousal 
In his review of the psychologicalliterature relating to psychopathy, Hare (1970) 
indicated the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has proposed that the 
term "tension-discharge disorder, impulse-ridden personality" be used in place of 
the term "psychopath" when applied to children. Hare (1970) described such an 
individual as one with "little anxiety, internalized conflict, or guilt . . . with 
failure to develop the capacity for tension storage and for the postponement 
of gratifications [p. 51 ." (For this chapter I continue to use the term psychopath 
for young and old.) Not only are psychopaths typically regarded as being "guilt- 
less" and low in capacity for fear and/or anxiety, but as high in their need for 
stimulation and thrill seeking. We focus first on the implications of the psycho- 
path being unable to  develop or sustain emotional arousal from those socializa- 
tion experiences that would cause negative emotional states in more normal 
children. 
It should be expected, if a lack of powerful and sustained emotional arousal is 
the root problem of psychopathy and some habitual criminality, that the primary 
focus of socialization and correctional techniques for such individuals might be 
through procedures that reliably elicit high levels of emotional arousal (in normal 
children), provided that those techniques are consistently applied and contingent 
upon negative behavior. Hare (1970) has suggested that psychopathy "may very 
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well represent the outcome of interactions between the characteristics (possibly 
congenital) of the child and the socialization techniques employed [p. 1011 ." 
He noted that cold, unaffectionate fathers who tend to be strict disciplinarians 
have fewer psychopathic children and that strict discipline tends also to decrease 
the incidence of adult psychopathy. But Hare's analysis should hold only if the 
strict discipline is consistently applied, for the reasons detailed above. Inconsistent, 
harsh discipline occasionally (noncontingently) applied should lead to  opposite 
results, since accurate (external) attributions become quite likely under such a 
regime. We would therefore expect that even with strict and consistent discipline 
that real self-control, as defined herein, would be achieved only slightly by child- 
ren who are chronically unresponsive emotionally, but that in detection-possible 
situations such procedures would result in socially acceptable behaviors. 
The picture that emerges is of an emotionally unresponsive individual who is 
likely to become the target of increasingly harsh socialization as parents and 
others become desperate to achieve positive change. But while that punishment 
should lead to some conditioned emotional arousal when the psychopath faces 
temptation, it should be quickly discounted in detection-free situations by the 
psychopath as irrelevant, since correctly attributed to punishment. This would 
be particularly true if the harsh discipline administered were inconsistent. There 
is some evidence that a noncontingent, harsh environment is related to the 
development of psychopathic behavior (e.g., Hare, 1970; Mandler, 1964; Kohl- 
berg, 1958) and that even though psychopaths do evidence normal levels of 
autonomic arousal under threatening conditions, they do not experience arousal 
as inhibiting emotion (Schachter & Latand, 1964). 
Let us return to the issue of the understimulated and stimulation-seeking 
side of psychopathy. Hare has reported that even in controlled laboratory 
situations, the psychopathic delinquent indicates a greater preference for levels 
of complexity and novelty (associated with seeking higher arousal levels) than 
normal controls. In their study of The Criminal Personality, Yochelson and 
Samenow (1976), though reluctant to use the term psychopath, described the 
habitual criminal as almost constantly seeking emotional stimulation, partly 
through turning to criminal activity; thus crime is not just the logical result of 
the lack of inhibitory control. Criminal activity may be experienced by the 
psychopath as a positive emotional stimulant. 
Indeed the psychopath's apparent need for criminal activity for its own sake 
(rather than to remedy conditions of material deprivation, if we accept the thesis 
of Youchelson and Samenow) provides some support for the idea that the criminal 
experiences the emotional arousal associated with the risks of crime as a positive 
emotional experience. That enjoyment of risk is apparently attained through the 
elimination of the belief that capture is possible, rendering punishment-induced 
emotional arousal irrelevant. Yochelson and Samenow discuss a process they 
label "cutoff' in which the chronic criminal convinces himself that all forms 
of danger are irrelevant to the ensuing crime. 
It was suggested above that the misattribution of the cause of (and hence the 
nature 00 certain emotions is maximized under conditions of low or moderate 
emotional arousal; the process of re-experiencing the emotional state associated 
with danger should therefore be relatively easy for the psychopath. 
This reinterpretation of emotional arousal originally stimulated by punish- 
ment and later elicited by the temptation situation does not mean that all emo- 
tional states might easily be derived from that initial fear-stimulated arousal. 
Discrete emotion theorists such as Izard (1971, 1972) and Plutchik (1962) 
have suggested that certain emotions are somewhat alike in underlying arousal. 
It should therefore be easier to reattribute or re-experience certain emotional 
states as certain specific others, since some arousal components may be common 
to a limited few similar states. (Certain arousal components may be common to 
all emotional states that have sympathetic nervous system involvement, as 
emphasized by Schachter and Singer [I9621 .) Specifically, for the present 
issue, Hebb (1946) has noted that the arousal common to both fear and excite- 
ment allows easy transition between those two emotional experiences. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Often the imposition of a new theoretical system to a substantive area of ven- 
erable interest results in new insights into those traditional issues and problems. 
Frequently, however, as new systems are embraced by theorists, momentum 
carries the theory into areas well beyond its range of convenience, as evidenced 
by claims of insight qualitatively superior to  that provided by other theoretical 
systems. In this chapter I have attempted to  avoid both the image and the fact 
of exaggerated claims; in fact, the major insight developed in this chapter could 
be that the emotion-attribution approach leads to recognition that the issues of 
moral socialization are far more complex than traditional moral judgment or 
avoidance theories would suggest. In place of relatively simple universal insight 
into moral development and socialization, I offer a theoretical pool muddied by 
complexity. However, it is possible with continued research and development 
that emotion-attribution theory will provide a means for establishing some order, 
to the end that the most important elements of individual differences and of 
socialization practices may be identified. A more articulate understanding of 
the interactions of those elements may follow. 
With several colleagues (Dienstbier et al., 1975) I have previously attempted 
to use emotion-attribution concepts to understand the interrelationship of 
moral judgment, as understood by Kohlberg (1958), with moral behavior ap- 
proaches as derived from learning theory. Without resurrecting that discussion, 
I shall elaborate briefly on the process of moral decision making, using emotion- 
attribution concepts. It was argued, in the paper cited above, that in our society 
the number of behaviors that elicit moral dilemmas are few, involving (usually) 
pain inflicted upon others, honesty, and theft or destruction of property. As we 
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mature, it is likely that different attributions about the specific temptation 
situations will emerge; that is, with social and cognitive development, different 
elements of an honesty situation may be important in defining the moral relevance 
of potential action. (The initial reading-comprehension research with college 
students reflects and illustrates this process.) But emotional responses may 
arise even in situations where initial attributional processes were not conducive 
to such response, for it is likely that the conditioned emotional response to such 
situations will be less differentiated than those attribution processes. (The 
research by Schachter and his colleagues with adrenalin and with the tranqualizer 
chlorpromazine reflects the importance of the level of emotional arousal.) It 
is suggested that one of the ways in which the individual decides which of 
several behavioral choices are appropriate is through an assessment of the emo- 
tional arousal that follows thinking about each behavioral option. As the individ- 
ual contemplates the behavioral options available, attempting simultaneously 
to make judgments about how the relevant value should be hierarchically ordered, 
emotion-attribution processes become important. Although our experience with 
our subjects suggests that individuals are not aware of making such attributions 
at a verbally articulate level, the research with adult subjects using placebo pills 
with "arousal" side effects, the final reading comprehension study with adults, 
and the research with children all reflect this process. 
At each of the levels of decision making described previously, the degree to 
which emotion is actually elicited, the attributions made, and the control those 
attributions have over the meaning of the emotional response will depend on the 
indivudal's capacity to develop and sustain arousal and the past socialization 
history of the individual as that history influences both the quantity and quality 
of emotional response developed in specific temptation situations. 
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